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Abstract 
The paper examines the impact of state trading on the 
operation of the East African Common Market. The first part of 
the paper develops a general framework for the analysis of this 
question. After setting out the alternative concepts of integ-
ration corresponding to the principles of integration in market 
economies and centrally planned economies and the role of state 
trading therein, the paper contrasts them with the situation in 
integration attempts among developing countries with different 
economic systems. This is followed by a discussion of the 
definition, functions, structure and operation of state trading 
enterprises. An attempt is then made to explore the impact of 
state trading systems on intra-regional trade in the light of 
various obstacles to the expansion of such trade. 
The second part of the paper traces the evolution and 
structure of state trading enterprises in the East African 
countries. The characteristics of state trading enterprises are 
then related to their impact on the growth of East African trade 
in recent years. Consideration is also given to other develop-
ments such as the increasing foreign exchange difficulties being 
experienced by the Partner States, especially Uganda and Tanzania, 
and the growth of the system of foreign trade planning in Tanzania. 
The implications of these developments for the East African Common 
Market are spelled out. In conclusion, the paper considers various 
recommendations to overcome obstacles to trade expansion posed by 
state trading enterprises, increasing foreign exchange difficulties 
and foreign trade planning. 
STATE TRADING AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
THE EAST AFRICAN EXPERIENCE * 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of the growth 
of state trading enterprises in the Partner States on the operation of the 
East African Common Market. By way of introduction, the first section 
analyses the relationship between state trading enterprises and alternative 
types of regional economic integration. The framework developed there is 
applied to the common market and state trading enterprises in East Africa. 
The paper concludes with some tentative suggestions designed to strengthen 
the Common Market and make state trading enterprises compatible with its 
effective operation. . 
ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTS OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
Regional integration can take diverse forms, involving varying 
degrees and patterns of social, political and economic co-operation.1 For 
our purposes, it is useful to distinguish between two types of integration 
arrangements: the one involving integration among market economy countries 
2 and the other among centrally planned economies. 
Integration among market economies consists in the creation of a 
customs union i.e. the abolition of all trade barriers among member states 
" In preparing this paper, I have had the benefit of discussions 
with a large number of academics of the universities in East Africa, 
officials of the Partner States and the East African Community, and of 
the state trading enterprises. I am deeply indebted to them for sharing 
their information and insights with me. 
1. The term economic integration can mean different things in 
different contexts: it may denote varying degrees of economic co-operation 
in a number of areas such as trade, mobility of labour and capital, payments, 
fiscal and monetary policies, social welfare provisions, and co-ordination 
of investment plans. This paper is concerned with the trade and related 
aspects of economic integration. 
2. These are variously referred to as "free enterprise", "private 
enterprise", "capitalistic", "competitive" economies, on the one hand, and 
"public enterprise", collectivist", "socialist" economies, on the other. 
In order to avoid terminological confusion, the former type of economies 
will be referred to in this paper as "private enterprise" and "market 
economies" and the latter as "public enterprise" and "centrally planned", 
though it should be noted that a public enterprise economy can operate 
through reliance on "markets", while a private enterprise economy may 
incorporate "central planning" in varying degrees. 
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and the erection of a common external tariff wall. The trade barriers may-
consist of tariffs, quantitative restrictions, outright prohibition of 
imports, licences, foreign exchange allocation, multiple exchange rates, 
and other administrative and regulatory measures designed to curb imports. 
The effective abolition of all trade barriers results in the creation of 
a single market for goods in the entire region. The resulting pattern of 
trade flows reflects differences in comparative advantage among member 
states. Thus the basic issue that arises in integration attempts among 
market economies is the creation of identical competitive conditions for 
producers, consumers and traders in the member countries. 
In the centrally planned economies, on the other hand, most of 
the enterprises are publicly-owned,and the economy is organised on the 
basis of comprehensive national development plans, which lay down detailed 
targets for production, consumption and investment. The amount and 
composition of trade is determined in large measure by the annual plan. 
The import and export plans may or may not be based on an assessment of 
comparative advantage. In a situation like this where the quantity and 
composition of imports is determined in physical terms by the plan, the 
commercial barriers of the type mentioned above are irrelevant. 
In keeping with the principles of their economies, most 
centrally planned economies conduct foreign trade through state export 
and import monopolies. Foreign trade is not regulated by the instruments 
found in market economies such as tariffs, exchange rate changes, licences 
etc. but by quantitative methods in accordance with the provisions of the 
annual plan. 
Integration in the context of centrally planned economies thus 
means the creation of trade through the co-ordination of plans. At one 
extreme this could consist of a single plan for the whole region drawn up 
by a supranational authority or by national planning agencies working 
together. The regional plan will allocate specific production goals to 
different member states, and trade among them will reflect the special-
isation of production implicit in the plan. The ideal of a single 
regional plan covering all the countries of the integration scheme may, 
however, be difficult to attain in the absence of some sort of federal 
government. The more usual pattern of integration among centrally 
planned countries is limited co-ordination of plans through agreements of 
inter-country specialisation in a limited range of products. Intra-
regional trade will then reflect specialisation in these products. 
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The actual process of integration among market economies and among 
centrally planned economies may differ in significant respects from the 
theoretical ideal. In the market economies, the process of integration may 
not always involve the creation of competitive conditions within the region 
in all sectors. In the case of the European Economic Community, which 
typifies integration among market economies, there have been departures 
from the competitive solution in the case of agriculture, coal and steel, 
and energy. In all these cases, the EEC has adopted what may be called 
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"marketing planning" solutions. 
Likewise, in the case of centrally planned economies, the process 
of integration may move nearer the model of market economies, if there were 
decentralisation of decision-making and greater reliance on the price 
mechanism. The recent reforms in Eastern Europe in the direction of 
decentralisation of planning and decision making in favour of individual 
enterprises could provide the basis for a different mode of integration. 
The leading example of economic integration among centrally planned 
economies is the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). Over 
the past decade and a half, economic integration among the member 
countries has been steadily strengthened, moving from ad hoc agreements 
on production and trade in a limited number of products to planned 
industrialisation and trade based on co-ordination of national development 
plans. 
3. For a discussion of the EEC, see D.L. McLachlan and D. Swan, 
Competitive Policy in the European Community (London, Oxford University 
Press, 1967); A.E. Walsh and John Paxton, The Structure and Development 
of the Common Market (London, Hutchinson, 1968); Dennis Swann, 
The Economics of the Common Market (Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1972). 
4-. United Nations, Economic Integration And Industrial Specialisation 
Among the Member Countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. 
(New York, 1966); CMEA Secretariat, Comprehensive Programme for the Further 
Extension and Improvement of Co-operation and the Development of Socialist 
Economic Integration by the CMEA Member Countries. (New York, 1971, United 
Nations). For recent reforms in Eastern Europe and their impact on economic 
integration, see S. Ausch, International Division of Labour and the Present 
Forms of Economic Mechanism in the CMEA countries, in I. Friss (editor), 
Reform of the Economic Mechanism in Hungary, (Budapest, 1969, Akademiai 
Kiado). 
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Neither of the two classical modes of integration are applicable in 
their entirety to economic integration among developing countries. In the 
first place, most of the integration arrangements among developing countries, 
unlike the EEC and CMEA, involve countries with significantly different 
economic systems. In the case of the East African Community, Tanzania has 
been moving progressively in the direction of a centrally planned economy, 
while Kenya and Uganda share in large measure the characteristics of a 
market economy. Similarly, in the Arab Common Market, the United Arab 
Republic, Syria and Iraq incorporate in varying degrees the characteristics 
associated with centrally planned econmies, while Jordan continues to be 
largely a private sector economy. The situation in the Andean Group is 
fluid but Chile is committed to moving in the direction of a centrally 
planned economy, while Colombia and Ecuador remain private sector economies. 
Secondly, there are very few developing countries which possess all 
the attributes either of market or of centrally planned economies. For 
example, developing countries which organise their economies on the model 
of centrally planned economies typically rely more on price mechanism for 
resource allocation than would be the case with most of the industrially 
advanced centrally planned economies. Similarly, the former have more 
private enterprise component in their economies than the latter. The 
developing market economies also differ from their developed counterparts 
in several respects. Firstly, the former are likely to be characterised 
more by monopolistic and oligopolistic structures in the modern sectors 
of their economies than the latter. Secondly, the public sector component 
of their economies tends to be more extensive than in the industrialised 
countries. Lastly, developing countries are more likely to have their 
economies regulated by non-price measures of one sort or another than the 
developed ones. The result of all these differences is that even though 
various developing countries may be described as market or centrally planned 
economies, their behaviour is likely to differ in significant respects from 
their developed counterparts. 
The upshot of the preceding argument is that integration arrangements 
among developing countries cannot be simple carbon copies of those prevailing 
among developed countries, whether market or centrally planned. Attempts to 
force them along the lines of one model or the other are bound to create 
difficulties and tensions and prove incompatible with the interest of one 
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member state or the other- There is, therefore, a need for devising new 
structures and processes of integration which will fully reflect the 
diversity and characteristics of the economies of developing countries 
participating in an integration arrangement, 
DEFINITION AND FUNCTIONS OF STATE TRADING ENTERPRISES 
At the outset it is important to define what is meant by a state 
trading enterprise. In the past a number of attempts have been made to 
define state trading enterprises in terms of participation, or effective 
control by state authorities; others have emphasised the monopoly element 
as the defining characteristic of state trading enterprises.^ In so doing, 
they have prejudged the issues in question. It is clear that different 
definitions may be appropriate in different contexts. For purposes of this 
paper, a state trading enterprise is defined simply as one which is either 
wholly or in significant proportion owned by the state. In this definition, 
there is no presumption about the policies and behaviour of state trading 
enterprises, nor about the control exercised by state authorities in the 
determination of its purchase and sales policies. 
This paper is concerned only with state trading enterprises engaged 
in the import business. It is useful to distinguish three categories of 
state participation in import business: 
1) A state agency may be created to import all or part of the 
requirements for the central and local organs of government; 
2) Public industrial, agricultural and mining enterprises may 
likewise import directly all or part of their own requirements; 
3) State trading enterprises may import for subsequent distribution 
to other enterprises and organisations either for their own use or for further 
sale to individuals and enterprises. 
Although all the three forms of state participation in import business 
may raise issues relevant for regional trade arrangements, this paper is con-
cerned primarily with issues raised by category (3), i.e. where enterprises 
import not for their own needs but for general distribution in the country. 
5. For a discussion of this question, see G.P. Verbit, Trade Agreements 
For Developing Countries, Chapter VI. (New York, Columbia University Press, 
1 a d a ) . 
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There are many reasons which have led countries to adopt partial or 
complete state trading in external commerce. Without being exhaustive, these 
may be summarised as follows:-
i) In socialist countries, complete state control of foreign trade 
through state enterprises isvan essential attribute of a centrally planned 
economy. The creation of state trading enterprises is merely the extension 
of the policy of public ownership in the field of foreign trade; 
ii) Countries may resort to state trading as an instrument of planning 
in the field of foreign trade. Governments, whether of centrally planned or 
market economies, may feel that they can more effectively control the volume, 
composition and prices of imports through state trading enterprises than 
through reliance on a system of private trading; 
iii) State trading enterprises may be created to bring .about diversi-
fication of external commercial links. They are (anTespecially^instrument 
for promotion of trade with centrally planned economies; 
iv) State trading enterprises may be created to promote price reduction 
through breaking up private monopolies and through bulk purchase, or to secure 
greater price stability through subsidies or long term purchase agreements; 
v) State trading enterprises may also be used to provide covert or 
overt protection to domestic industry against imports. The advantage of 
providing protection through state trading enterprises, over other conventional 
measures, is that apart from its greater effectiveness, it is very difficult 
to establish the fact that domestic products are in fact being protected; 
vi) Some countries have established state trading enterprises to grant 
special privileges to certain groups of persons, either by restricting the 
distribution of imported products to such persons or by supplying goods to 
them at favourable prices to enable them to compete with other traders; 
vii) One of the oldest functions of state trading enterprises is to serve 
as a source of revenue. This is especially the case with such commodities as 
tobacco and alcohol; 
viii) A country may substitute state for private trading in order to close 
a loophole in the system of foreign exchange controls. In countries with 
exchange controls, over-invoicing of imports and underinvoicing of exports is 
a common technique for transferring capital abroad. The elimination of this 
practice may be one of the objectives of establishing state trading enterprises; 
ix) Finally, state trading in certain products such as narcotics, alcohol, 
pharmaceutical goods, arms and ammunition etc. may be justified on grounds of 
health, national security etc. 
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STRUCTURE AND OPERATION OF STATE TRADING ENTERPRISES 
Before exploring the impact of state trading enterprises on regional 
trading blocs, it may be useful to say a few words about some of their relevant 
characteristics. Three aspects of their structure and operation are especially 
relevant to regional trade arrangements: extent of state trading, structure 
and decision-making, and linkages with wholesale trade and domestic productive 
enterprises. 
There may be a great deal of variation in the extent of state parti-
cipation in the import business. In general, the range of products handled 
by state trading enterprises will depend on the purposes for which they were 
created in the first instance. In centrally planned economies, all.or a 
substantial part of imports may be handled directly by state trading enter-
prises. In other cases, a narrower range of products, justified on grounds 
of protection, revenue, balance of payments, health and security, or of 
promotion of indigenous traders, may be confined to state trading enterprises. 
In some countries, fairly clear cut criteria may be used in allocating 
importing rights between private and public trading enterprises. More often, 
the distributioi^f importing rights will have evolved over time in response 
to specific pressures and needs and may not reflect any overriding criterion. 
As far as the structure and decision-making of state trading enterprises 
are concerned, there are at least four aspects of this question. Firstly, it 
is useful to know whether the state trading system consists of one mammoth 
corporation with divisions specialising in the importation of various goods 
and services, or of a number of enterprises co-ordinate with and more or less 
independent of each other. In the former case, it would be useful to have 
information about the exact relationship between the parent company and the 
specialised divisions in terms of management, finances and decision-making. 
Likewise, in the latter case, it would be useful to know the mechanism for 
co-ordinating the policies of different state trading enterprises. 
The second structural aspect relates to whether the state trading 
enterprises have resulted in monopoly, competition, or something in between. 
The third aspect relates to their links with the organs of government such 
as the ministries of finance, planning, economy, commerce and industry, and 
central banks. At one extreme, the state trading enterprises may be integ-
rated tightly into the governmental machinery and subordinated to one ministry 
or the other, with the consequence that all major decisions bearing on the 
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policies of the enterprises are taken within the Government. The other extreme 
is where state trading enterprises function largely independently of the Govern-
ment; state control may amount to no more than the issuance of very general 
directives at the time of their establishment and the examination of their 
annual reports. In between these two extremes, there are numerous structural 
arrangements allowing for varying degrees of governmental control and influence 
on the operation of state trading enterprises. 
The fourth and closely related question is the decision-making process 
in the state trading enterprises. The degree of autonomy enjoyed by the state 
trading enterprises in decision-making at various levels vis-a-vis the relevant 
ministries, as well as the process of decision-making within the enterprises 
themselves, are of relevance when evaluating the impact of state enterprises 
on regional trade blocs. 
The links between the state importing enterprises and the internal 
distribution system have a close bearing on the working of regional integration 
schemes. There is considerable diversity in the patterns of internal distrib-
ution of imported goods. One possibility is that state trading enterprises 
may also be entrusted with the function of wholesale distribution of imported 
goods and in some cases, though this is rare in developing countries, of retail 
distribution as well. Even if the state trading enterprises do not engage in 
wholesale distribution, this function may be assigned to another enterprise(s) 
specialising in wholesale distribution. There is also, of course, the possib-
ility that the wholesale and retail distribution of imported goods may be left 
entirely or in part to private traders. Yet another possibility is for the 
importing and distributing functions for particular products to be assigned 
to the domestic productive enterprises engaged in the production of that 
product. 
A related issue is the system of distribution for domestically produced 
goods competing with imports. Once again there are a number of possibilities. 
In the first place, the productive enterprise may itself arrange the wholesale 
distribution of its output. Secondly, the state trading enterprise assigned 
rights of importation may be required to undertake the wholesale distribution 
of similar domestic goods. Thirdly, in countries with specialised state-owned 
wholesale distributors, these may be given the responsibility for distributing 
both the imported and domestic products. Finally, while the wholesale distri-
bution of imported goods may be in the hands of state trading enterprises, 
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the distribution of domestically produced goods may be left largely in the 
hands of private traders. 
IMPACT OF STATE TRADING ENTERPRISES ON REGIONAL INTEGRATION SCHEMES 
The role of state trading enterprises in regional economic integration 
will depend on the nature of integration. In regional trade arrangements among 
centrally planned economies, the state trading enterprises play an important 
role in fulfilling the export-import commitments entered into as a result of 
the agreement. The existence of such enterprises facilitates the fulfilment 
of such commitments, as their purchasing policies can be more easily controlled 
by the Government. 
On the other hand, in regional integration schemes among market 
economies, state trading enterprises are often looked upon as distorting 
fair competition, and often elaborate rules are devised to govern the 
behaviour of such enterprises to ensure equality of treatment between 
domestic products and the competing imports from the member states. This 
is done either by eliminating public trading monopolies or by ensuring, 
through a variety of means, adequate and fair access for products from the 
member states. 
When we consider regional trade agreements among countries with 
different economic systems, as is typically the case with such agreements 
among developing countries, the existence of state trading enterprises 
creates both opportunities for expanded trade as well as additional 
difficulties in the way of its expansion, depending upon the prior 
constraints to expanded trade and the mode of integration. State trading 
enterprises would appear to be a particularly suitable means of trade 
expansion under at least three circumstances. In the first place, as is 
well known, trade among developing countries is hampered not only by the 
high cost and low quality of many of the products manufactured but also by 
the failure to develop adequate commercial and financial links, by lack of 
information about product availability, and prejudices of importers and 
6. For a full discussion of these problems in the context of 
multilateral and regional trade treaties, see K.W. Dam, The GATT-Law 
and International Economic Organisation (Chicago, University of 
Chicago Press, 1970), Ch. 18; McLachland and Swan, op. cit., pp 59-60; 
and EFTA Bulletin, Vol. VIII No. 2, March - April 1967: Public 
Undertakings. 
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distributors in favour of the well-known brands originating in developed 
countries. State trading enterprises are well suited to counter some of 
these obstacles to trade expansion among member countries by forging new 
commercial and financial links, by introduction of new products and brands, 
and generally by improving knowledge about product availability and marketing 
possibilities in the member countries. 
Secondly, in situations where trade is hampered by lack of foreign 
exchange which is reflected in numerous quantitative and other restrictions, 
or by detailed regulation of trade through direct controls in countries 
practising some form of central planning, state enterprises can play a 
positive role in trade creation through agreements to expand trade annually 
among member countries by specified amounts or proportions. State trading 
enterprises may be better able to fulfil trade commitments embodied in such 
bilateral or multilateral agreements than the private traders. 
Similarly, where the emphasis in a particular integration scheme is 
on trade expansion through the co-ordinated development of new industries 
on a region wide basis, the state trading enterprises may be better suited 
than private traders to fulfil commitments with respect to exchanges of 
particular products. This is so because it is easier for the Government 
to control the policies and plans of state enterprises to ensure compliance 
with such undertakings, even when some of the transactions may not be fully 
justified by commercial considerations. This point is particularly relevant 
in situations where the existence of an integration scheme may be threatened 
by large imbalances in the trade among member countries. Correction of such 
imbalances may require purchases from the deficit countries even when these 
may not be justified on purely commercial grounds. Private traders interested 
primarily in profit maximisation cannot be expected to take such considerations 
into account when making purchasing decisions. While thus under such circum-
stances, state trading enterprises can play an important role in trade expansion, 
there are situations when their operations hinder the intra-regional trade. 
If the emphasis in a regional trade arrangement is placed on trade liberal-
isation through abolition of trade barriers, and reliance on market forces, 
state trading enterprises may hinder this objective in the following ways:-
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i) They may follow a discriminatory purchasing policy which has the 
effect of providing protection to domestic production against imports from 
the member countries in contravention of the agreement on economic integration. 
There are many ways of varying degrees of subtlety through which a discrimin-
atory purchasing policy may be practised. Either acting under instructions 
or on its own initiative, a state trading enterprise with monopoly in 
importation may decide not to import a product from the member states even 
though on grounds of price, quality or terms of payment and delivery, the 
imported product may be considered superior to the local product. A slightly 
more subtle way of pursuing a discriminatory policy may be by adding high 
mark-ups to imports, or of charging high commission to importers, so that 
the imports were put at a price disadvantage in the domestic market. The 
possibilities of discriminating against imports by this means obviously 
increase with the number of state-controlled stages of distribution of 
imports e.g. if not only the importation but also the wholesale and retail 
distribution were in the hands of state enterprises. Likewise, the administ-
rative procedures for obtaining imports whether by the state trading enterprises 
or by agents appointed by them could be so burdensome and lengthy as to 
constitute a serious barrier to trade. The above techniques may also be used 
of course to favour imports from one partner state as against others. 
ii) A state trading enterprise may also discriminate against imports 
from member countries in favour of imports from the third countries. This may 
happen for instance if the country has trade, aid or payments agreement with 
another country outside the trading bloc, under which it enters into a commit-
ment to purchase specified quantities or values of certain products from it. 
Even in the absence of such an agreement, the state trading enterprises may 
either under instructions or acting on their own initiative pursue a policy 
of buying in the cheapest source in disregard of the tariff schedule in 
existence. If their decisions are based on c.i.f. values of imports, then 
the discrimination in favour of suppliers in the regional bloc which is the 
basis of the integration scheme is eliminated, and member countries are treated 
on par with suppliers from the third countries. While such a policy is rational 
from the point of view of the country,it is incompatible with the provisions 
of most integration schemes. 
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The operation of state trading enterprises could thus constitute an 
impediment to the objectives of integration; but whether it does so or not, 
will depend on the purchasing policies pursued by the enterprise. These in 
turn are largely a function of the structure and organisation of state 
enterprises, and in particular of their autonomy from the governmental 
machinery and the degree of competition among the enterprises themselves. 
THE EVOLUTION OF THE EAST AFRICAN COMMON MARKET 
The general framework of analysis developed above can now be applied 
to the East African situation. We shall describe briefly the evolution of the 
Common Market since the signature of the Treaty, before moving to a discussion 
of the growth of state trading enterprises and their impact on East African 
trade. As is well known, the Treaty for East African Co-operation created 
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a modified customs union in the region. The m a m exceptions to the free 
movement of goods among Partner States are certain agricultural goods -
mostly staple foods or major export crops, subject to special marketing 
arrangements, on which the Partner States are entitled to levy quantitative 
restrictions, and the right to levy transfer taxes by deficit countries on 
imports of manufactured goods from the surplus Partner States. The duration 
of these taxes, their magnitude and the products on which they may be levied 
are laid down in the Treaty. 
Since the establishment of the East African Community, a number of 
developments have taken place in the Partner States which have affected the 
working of the Common Market. Of these, the three most important ones are 
the growth of state trading enterprises; the gradual extension of central 
planning; and the balance of payments difficulties experienced by the Partner 
States. Since state trading enterprises are discussed in the next section, the 
discussion here will focus on the other two points. 
The Treaty was based on the assumption of the existence of largely 
private enterprise, market economies in the Partner States. But even before 
the Treaty became operational, this assumption had been rendered invalid by 
the extensive nationalisation of large enterprises in agriculture, manufacturing,, 
commerce and construction in Tanzania, following the Arusha Declaration of 
1967. Since then, nationalisation has been extended to wholesale trade, 
urban properties and other economic activities. In 1970, Uganda also launched 
a large scale nationalisation move, which was partially reversed after the 
7. Treaty for East African Co-operation (Nairobi, Government Printer, 1967). 
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military coup of the following year. Although no comparable large scale 
nationalisation has taken place in Kenya, the Government has moved to acquire 
majority or significant participation in a number of key sectors of the 
economy. 
These developments have been accompanied by changes in the organ-
isation of foreign trade. The creation of state trading enterprises in the 
Partner States is one manifestation of it; another is the gradual extension 
of planning to imports and exports in Tanzania. The increasing difficulties 
in foreign exchange experienced by the Partner States over the past two years 
have been another contributory factor to the modification of their commercial 
policies. Since these have affected substantially the working of the Common 
Market, it is necessary to give a brief account of them. 
Since the sharp fall in foreign exchange reserves in 1971, the 
Uganda Government has taken a number of measures designed to curb imports. 
As from the 1st December, 1971, all imports have to be registered with the 
Bank of Uganda. Importers are required to make import deposits with the g 
Bank of Uganda before they can be granted foreign exchange. Spare parts 
and raw materials are exempted from this requirement, but other essential 
imports need a deposit equal to 10 per cent of the c.i.f. value of imports; 
the proportion of deposits increases to 50 and 100 per cent depending upon 
the nature of imports, the highest rate being levied on luxury imports. 
These deposits have to be maintained for a period of six months for imports 
from outside East Africa and for three months for imports for the Partner 
States. In addition to this requirement, some administrative discretion is 
used in allocating foreign exchange for imports, licences being withheld for 
products which are available locally. In addition, there is a monthly ceiling 
of £5 m. on the level of imports. Thus it is possible for importers to get 
foreign exchange allocation but importation of the products may be delayed. 
Apart from this, there does not appear to be any elaborate planning of 
imports permitted into the country. 
In Tanzania, attempts have been made in recent months to evolve some 
sort of foreign exchange plan. As far as imports are concerned, notional 
ceilings are laid down for different categories of imports reflecting 
development priorities and availability of local goods. The import plan 
8. This requirement was abolished in June, 1972. 
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is implemented by the Bank of Tanzania. The Import Controller is advised by 
an inter-ministerial Advisory Committee on Imports, based in the Bank of 
Tanzania. Imports are regulated by a system of licences. The bulk of imports 
are confined to parastatals, and only a small proportion come under the Open 
General Licence (OGL). However, some of the goods listed under the OGL are 
also confined to parastatals. Licences must be obtained for the importation 
of all goods. The necessary foreign exchange is released only after the 
licence has been obtained. Imports from the Partner States, whether they are 
confined to parastatal bodies or not, require import licences. 
In Kenya, imports are divided into two categories: those under General 
Open Licences (GOP), which do not require an import licence; and those under 
Specific Import Licences (SIL), which are further subdivided into three 
schedules A, B and C. Importation of goods under schedule B is prohibited 
altogether while those under C are restricted. After the additional 
restrictions introduced in December, 1971, several goods previously imported 
under GOP were transferred to Schedules D and E. Foreign exchange will not 
be made available for goods classified under Schedule E, while goods under 
Schedule D will require foreign exchange allocation licence. Furthermore, 
quotas were established for goods grouped under Schedule C. As far as 
imports from the Partner States are concerned, they are not subject to 
licence or foreign exchange allocation requirements except those which are 
confined to National Trading Corporation. Apart from these regulations, 
Kenya does not have a system of detailed foreign trade planning, with ceilings 
for different categories of imports in accordance with the annual development 
plan. 
It will, therefore, be clear from the above account that there has been 
a considerable modification of the principle of a common market, as stipulated 
under the Treaty for East African Co-operation, due mainly to the increasing 
foreign exchange difficulties being experienced by the Partner States but also 
in some measure due to the extension of planning to the field of foreign trade. 
The net result of all this has been a steady erosion of free movement of goods 
and services within East Africa. The subsequent discussion of the role of state 
trading enterprises in the East African trade must be viewed in the light of 
these developments; for often the barriers to intra-regional trade ascribed 
to state trading enterprises have deeper roots in the changing economic 
systems and foreign exchange difficulties. The state trading enterprises 
are often no more than immediate agents of the execution of import policies. 
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EVOLUTION AND STRUCTURE OF STATE TRADING ENTERPRISES IN EAST AFRICA 
State trading enterprises were established in the sixties in the 
East African countries. Although they all participate in the import business, 
there are considerable differences in the functions they perform, the scope 
of their activities, and their structure and organisation. It will, therefore, 
be appropriate to start with a brief description of their features prior to a 
discussion of their impact on regional trade. 
In keeping with the economic ideology of Tanzania, the main function 
9 
of the State Trading Corporation (STC) is the socialisation of trade. 
Consequently, over the past few years, the scope of the products handled by 
the STC has been steadily increased. The STC imports directly a large variety 
of imports. In 1970, about 32% of the total imports were confined to STC; of 
this, it physically handled about 75%. The remainder of the imports were 
distributed as follows: Government Ministries - 25%; National Development 
Corporation - 30% and Private Importers - 5%. NDC and its subsidiaries are 
responsible for importing their own requirements, and in some cases, the 
products manufactured by them. The STC was originally supposed to act as 
both an importing and wholesaling organisation. But it performed the whole-
saling function in four districts only. For the rest of the country, it 
continued to utilise the services of the private established wholesalers for 
distribution of imported goods. 
It was intended that the STC will also handle the wholesale distribution 
of locally manufactured goods, but this has not happened. The local manufact-
urers are free to distribute their goods through STC, private wholesalers, or 
through their own distribution system. In fact, many of the larger enterprises 
continue to distribute their goods directly; others make use of private 
9. The functions, structure and scope of the STC are currently under 
review by the Tanzanian Government. A Parliamentary Select Committee appointed 
to look into some aspects of trade has recently published a report. An inter-
ministerial committee appointed by the Government has also been studying the 
question of external and internal trade. It is likely that as a result of 
these inquiries, there may be major changes in the working of the STC. The 
account given here relates to the situation as it existed at the beginning 
of 1972. 
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wholesalers; relatively few appear to utilise the STC facilities. 
The policy-making body in the STC is the Board of Directors, which 
consists of Principal Secretaries from a number of economic ministries, the 
Chairman of the Board being the Principal Secretary in the Office of the 
President. The Board is responsible for laying down the main policy and 
meets periodically to review the working of the STC."^ The Minister of 
Commerce and Industry, under whose Ministry the Corporation falls, has 
powers to issue directives to the STC. 
The chief executive of the Corporation is the Managing Director. 
The Corporation is divided into four divisions - General Merchandise, 
Agricultural Machinery and Technical Equipment, Export and Shipping. 
Each of the divisions is further subdivided into product divisions, each 
headed by a product manager. The line of responsibility runs from product 
manager to division head to the Managing Director. 
The Kenya National Trading Corporation (K.N.T.C.) was established 
with the main purpose of promoting Africanisation of commerce. A total of 
49 products in the field of provisions, textiles, and hardwares, have been 
confined to KNTC. Of these products, some are specified and can only be 
handled by other citizen traders. The KNTC is also, of course, free to 
handle items not legally confined to it, just like any other trader. The 
Corporation buys certain items on its own account such as sugar, salt, 
cement and bicycles. These are then sold to wholesalers who are appointed 
distributors for KNTC products. About 60% of the KNTC turnover is in these 
products. For the rest of the products, the KNTC appoints agents who are 
responsible for the importation and sale of these goods. KNTC gets a 
commission on these products. 
10. After the decision to socialise the wholesale trade, a Committee 
of Implementation was set up, consisting of several Principal Secretaries 
and other leading officials. There is some overlapping membership between 
the Committee and the Board; while the former is concerned with matters 
internal to the STC;, the latter has a wider mandate covering the whole 
question of socialisation of trade. 
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In principle, the confinement of products to KNTC applies both to 
imported and locally produced goods. In practice, it has proved extremely 
difficult to enforce this with respect to locally produced goods. Thus 
while KNTC handles imported products confined to it, not all of the 
similar locally produced goods pass through its hands. The wholesale 
distribution of its products is given to African traders, in keeping with 
its policy of promoting African share in commerce. 
KNTC is a subsidiary of the Industrial and Commercial Development 
Corporation. The final policy-making body is the Board of Directors, with 
its Chairman and Vice-Chairman. The latter is also the Permanent Secretary, 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry. The Board functions independently subject 
to broad policy directives from the Minister of Commerce and Industry. It 
meets once every month or every second month. The chief executive of the 
Corporation is the General Manager. 
The Corporation is divided into three departments - Commercial, 
Accounts, and Personnel. The Commercial Department is further sub-divided 
into sections dealing with textiles, hardware, produce, investment and 
market research. The other departments are also sub-divided into sections. 
Each of the sections is headed by an Assistant Manager. Thus the chain of 
responsibility runs from the Assistant Managers to the Division Managers 
to the Managing Director. 
The original purpose behind the establishment of the state trading 
enterprise in Uganda was to extend both state and African participation in 
trade. There have been a number of important changes in Uganda in the last 
two years with respect to state trading enterprises. The current position 
is that, in contrast to Kenya and Tanzania, there are two parastatal bodies 
dealing with trade. The Uganda National Trading Corporation (NTC) was 
created to deal in certain specified goods, both imported and locally 
produced, and to distribute them to African traders. In May 1970, however, 
a new body called Export and Import Corporation (EIC) was established to 
deal with all external trade. After the change of regime in Uganda, the 
EIC was turned basically into a licensing body for imports.11 
11. In the Third Five Year Development Plan for Uganda, it is stated: 
"Government has recently reviewed the operations of the NTC and the Export 
and Import Corporation. Consequent upon this review, it has been decided 
to set up early in the Plan period, a new corporation, to be known as the 
State Trading Corporation (STC). The staff and facilities of the two existing 
corporations will form the core of the STC". p. 24-7. At the time of writing, 
this fusion had not taken place. 
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The current position, therefore, is that all non-government imports must be 
licensed by the EIC. Although soon after its establishment a number of 
imports were confined to the Corporation in which it was to have monopoly, 
subsequently it was decided that it will not handle imports on its own account. 
All importers must first obtain an import licence from the Corporation for 
which it charges a commission of i~o of the c.i.f. value of imports. This 
commission is waived for imports by some parastatals, and also in respect 
of raw materials, spare parts, machinery and equipment. In its licensing 
decision, the Corporation is guided by the foreign exchange position, the 
nature of the product to be imported, and the availability of local products. 
The Corporation is governed by a Board of Directors who are 
appointed by the Minister of Commerce and Industry. The Chairman of the Board 
is also the Managing Director of the Corporation. Other members of the Board 
are independent persons with business experience. The Board makes the final 
policy decisions subject to directives from the Government. It meets once or 
twice a month. The Corporation is divided into six divisions, which are headed 
by Managers. These divisions are textiles, motor vehicles, food products, tyres, 
wines and spirits, and the Co-ordinating Department. 
NTC has a monopoly in the importation of certain essential products 
such as salt, rice, sugar, hollow-ware, oils, fishnets, etc. Although it 
enjoys a legal monopoly in the importation of these products, these continue 
to be imported by other traders as well. It is estimated that NTC imports 
account for a mere 3% of total imports coming into the country. The Corporation 
has appointed sub-distributors who perform the wholesaling function. Local 
manufacturers of these products may either use the NTC facilities, or distribute 
them directly. Like other importers, NTC is also required to obtain an import 
licence from the EIC. 
The final policy decisions are taken by the Board of Directors, 
whose Chairman is the Managing Director of NTC, and which meets once a month. 
Other members, who may or may not be Government officials, are appointed by 
the Minister for Commerce and Industry. The Permanent Secretary in the 
Ministry is one of the members of the Board. The Board is subject to policy 
directives from the Government. The Corporation is divided into four depart-
ments: Administration, Operation, Cash and Personnel. 
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IMPACT OF STATE TRADING ENTERPRISES ON THE COMMON MARKET AND TRADE IN 
EAST AFRICA 
It is not possible to measure quantitatively the impact of state 
trading enterprises on the working of the common market and the growth of 
East African trade. It has already been mentioned that the state trading 
enterprises have been only one among a number of factors which have eroded 
the functioning of free trade among the Partner States. Before examining 
the possible impact of state trading enterprises, it is necessary to see 
how the other factors - foreign exchange difficulties and planning of foreign 
trade - have affected the East African trade. 
The move towards planning of foreign trade in Tanzania in fact 
implies that the volume and composition of imports coming into the country 
will increasingly be related to requirements arising out of the annual plan. 
If this principle is extended to imports from the Partner States, as appears 
to be the case, the whole basis of a common market, as embodied in the Treaty, 
is undermined; for the principle of a common market implies that imports 
from the member states must be permitted without any barriers and treated in 
all respects on par with domestic products. Clearly then, the kind of foreign 
trade planning envisaged in Tanzania is incompatible with the conventional 
common market. It is not possible to say to what extent the imports from the 
Partner States have been hindered by the move towards foreign trade planning 
and the accompanying system of licences and priorities for imports; but that 
it has had a negative effect on the growth of East African trade is beyond 
doubt. 
Similarly, the system of import licensing in Uganda, with priority 
given to essential products, and those not available locally, combined with 
the import deposit requirements, is an infringement of the principle of 
common market in that it introduces administrative barriers to imports from 
the Partner States and results in favourable treatment of domestic products 
over imports from the Partner States. 
The policies pursued by the state trading enterprises are often 
a mere reflection of these wider national commercial policies. But in 
addition to these factors, do the state trading enterprises constitute 
additional, autonomous obstacles? There are at least three ways in which 
this may happen, and these are borne out by the experience in East Africa. 
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In the first place, the state trading corporations may be under 
instructions to give preference to domestic suppliers over suppliers in the 
Partner States in their purchasing decisions. It is, for example, alleged 
that the STC is required to give a preferential margin of 20 - 25% to 
domestic suppliers in its purchasing decisions. Likewise, the Export and 
Import Corporation is alleged to satisfy itself that a particular product 
is not available locally before approving a particular import licence. 
Allegations have also been made that with the confinement of batteries 
and tyres to KNTC, the latter has tended to favour Kenyan made products 
over the competing products from the Partner States. Examples of alleged 
discriminatory practices of this sort could be multiplied from all the 
three countries. 
Secondly, the operation of state trading enterprises may in 
effect result in discrimination against imports from the Partner States, 
even though this may not have been the intention. This can happen for a 
number of reasons such as the charging of high margins on imported goods, 
confinement of imports and wholesale distribution of imported products 
while the locally manufactured products have no restrictions on their 
distribution, the administrative delays experienced by importers compared 
with the distribution of local products, the inefficiency of state trading 
enterprises, and so on. There is no evidence that differential profit 
margins have been used by any state trading corporation in East Africa to 
discourage imports. On the other hand, it has already been shown that in 
all the three countries, while confinement to state trading enterprises 
of certain imported products is widespread, this regulation is seldom, if 
ever, enforced on local competing products. This may confer important 
advantages to local products vis-a-vis imports from the Partner States. 
Furthermore, administrative delays involved in obtaining import licences 
and the inefficient operation of state trading enterprises may also have 
hindered the growth of imports in Uganda and Tanzania from the Partner 
States. 
Thirdly, imports from the Partner States may be discriminated 
against vis-a-vis imports from the third countries, because the latter 
are cheaper on c.i.f. basis. In all three countries, imports by the state 
trading corporations are subject to import duties. Nor have the enterprises 
been directed to purchase on the basis of the c.i.f. value alone. Therefore, 
this sort of discrimination against imports from the Partner States does not 
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appear to have been practised on any significant scale. However, trade agree-
ments by individual countries with third parties may have the same effect, 
even though thi^as not intended. For example, under the agreement for the 
financing of the Tanzam Railway, the local costs incurred in Tanzania are 
financed by the importation and sale of Chinese goods. This in effect means 
that Tanzania is committed to buying goods worth a certain amount every year 
from China. Such purchases must inevitably have an effect of diverting trade 
away from the Partner States, unless the goods specified were those not pro-
duced in East Africa. This has not been the case with purchases from China 
which have included a large variety of consumer goods. 
There is no simple way of calculating the trade reducing effect of 
the factors mentioned above, but there can be little doubt of the fact that 
trade among East African countries would have expanded at a higher rate over 
the past three years in the absence of the obstacles mentioned above. 
SOME TENTATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE COMMON MARKET AND STATE TRADING 
ENTERPRISES IN EAST AFRICA 
The earlier discussion has brought out the serious erosion of the 
common market in East Africa which has taken place over the past two to three 
years. It seems clear that unless a deliberate effort is made to reverse 
these trends, the drift towards disintegration of the common market will 
continue, throttling East African trade and jeopardising other areas of 
co-operative activity. At the same time it is clear that the solution to 
the problems of the East African Common Market and trade cannot lie in a 
restoration of the economic structures and policies which prevailed a few 
years ago. A durable and realistic solution to these problems must take 
into account not only the existing diversity in economic organisation and 
ideology among the Partner States, including the diverse role of state 
trading enterprises, but also the recent changes in economic conditions 
such as foreign exchange difficulties, which are likely to continue for the 
foreseeable future. What is needed is a series of concerted measures 
designed to strengthen the common market and to lay the basis for a new 
dynamism to the East African trade. 
In the first place, the Common Market must be made a reality. 
This has implications for the operation of state trading enterprises and 
for measures taken to safeguard balance of payments. As far as state 
trading enterprises are concerned, it is important to ensure that they 
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follow non-discriminatory policies with respect to imports from the Partner 
States. One way of doing this would be through restructuring of state trading 
enterprises to allow for internal competition. If state trading enterprises 
are allowed autonomy in their operations and are required within a country 
to compete with each other in their purchases and sales, their behaviour may 
approximate that of private traders. Adoption of this system is perfectly 
compatible with public ownership of means of production and exchange within 
the economy, as is shown by the experience of a number of socialist countries 
in Eastern Europe. Although this solution would solve most of the problems 
connected with the operation of state trading enterprises, it does not appear 
feasible in the East African circumstances. The scarcity of managerial and 
executive personnel, the organisational problems, and the possible foregoing 
of benefits of economies of scale and specialisation, would preclude the 
adoption of this system at this juncture in East Africa. 
The alternative would be to move towards an approximation of this 
system by devising a set of rules for the operation of state trading monopolies. 
The purpose of these rules would be to ensure that imports originating from 
the Partner States are treated identically in all respects to the domestic 
products. The East African countries have already agreed in principle to 
12 the kind of rules that would be necessary. These rules state:-
1. Where the State Trading Corporation, or any authorised distributor 
or dealer, acts as principal, it/he must undertake to purchase promptly and, 
where commercially appropriate, to stock goods produced in other Partner States. 
2. Where the State Trading Corporation, or any authorised distributor or 
dealer, acts as agent, it/he must accept and place promptly any order from 
dealers for goods produced in other Partner States. 
3. Where the State Trading Corporation, or any authorised distributor 
or dealer, acts as principal, its/his profit margin and other charges on 
any commodity must be the same for goods produced locally as for goods 
produced in other Partner States, other things being equal, and must in 
no circumstances exceed its/his profit margin and other charges on the 
same commodity imported from foreign countries. 
4. Where the State Trading Corporation, or any authorised distributor 
or dealer, acts as agent, its/his commission on any commodity TTlUS"t h e the 
same for goods produced locally, other things being equal, and must in no 
circumstances exceed its/his, commission on the same commodity impcr-ted 
from foreign countries. 
12. Supplied by the Common Market Secretariat of the East African 
Community. 
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5. The Commission and/or profit margin applied by the State Trading 
Corporation to distributors and/or sub-distributors of any commodity must 
be the same for goods produced locally as for goods produced in other 
Partner States, other things being equal. 
6. Profit margins taken by the State Trading Corporation, or any 
authorised distributor or dealer, on goods from other Partner States and 
of which there is no domestic production must not be excessively high in 
relation to the services rendered. 
7. Confinements which are applicable to goods produced in other 
Partner States must equally be applied to foreign imports and domestic 
production of the same commodities. 
8. Distributive outlets for goods imported from other Partner States 
must not be so reduced by the State Trading Corporation or any authorised 
distributor or dealer, as to restrict sales and service facilities to the 
detriment of trade. 
While it is possible in theory to agree on a set of rules applicable 
to state trading confinements, in actual practice it may prove extremely 
difficult to implement them. The East African countries have already agreed 
upon the implementation procedures for these rules. But in the end the only 
guarantee of compliance with these rules must be the good faith of the Govern-
ments concerned. Nevertheless, if the rules are to prove workable, there must 
be provision at some level for adjudication on disputes arising over their 
implementation. 
An alternative way of ensuring fair competition for products from 
the member countries is to allow manufacturers and traders in one country to 
set up importing and distribution facilities in the other countries. This 
assumes that apart from state trading, there are no foreign exchange or other 
barriers to importation from the member countries, and thus the existence of 
competitive importing and distribution facilities will ensure that state 
trading enterprises will not be able to provide covert protection to domestic 
manufacturers. This proposal amounts to a virtual abandonment of monopoly 
for state trading enterprises in individual products or for all imports. 
The acceptance of any of the above solutions would go a long way in 
removing the difficulties which have arisen in the Common Market over the 
operation of state trading enterprises. But the difficulties caused by scarcity 
of foreign exchange will still persist. It is, therefore, important to devise 
arrangements which will cushion East African trade against restrictions applied 
on balance of payments grounds. The Treaty for East African Co-operation does 
not contain any provisions on this. What is needed is a set of rules which 
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would state clearly the circumstances under which restrictive measures might 
be applied to imports from the Partner States. The rules should also define 
the duration of these measures and the kind of restrictions that would be 
permitted. At the least, the restrictions on imports from the Partner States 
should be less onerous than on external imports. 
However, unless more positive steps are taken, the restrictions 
placed on balance of payments grounds can all too easily turn into permanent 
obstacles to East African trade. If the payments difficulties persist for a 
long time, consideration should be given to devaluation by the state experiencing 
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trade deficits. If the payments difficulties are of a short run nature, the 
East African trade may be cushioned against them by the creation of some sort 
of payments arrangements among the Partner States. The purpose of such an 
arrangement would be to provide short to medium term credit to the countries 
experiencing payments difficulties for purchases from the Partner States. The 
bulk of the finance for the scheme would have to be provided through external 
assistance. The scheme could either be operated by the three Central Banks or 14. by the East African Development Bank. 
In addition to these steps to strengthen the Common Market, it is 
necessary to provide a new basis for a dynamic expansion of East African trade 
through a co-ordinated development of new industries. Past experience in East 
Africa has indicated the great difficulty in achieving agreement on a comprehensive 
programme for joint industrialisation. For the immediate future, the target 
should be a more limited one; ad hoc agreements on production, location, and 
marketing of specified industries of a regional nature. This approach to the 
problem has been successfully adopted in the Andean Group in Latin America. 
13. The case for devaluation by a Partner State in persistent payments 
difficulties has been argued cogently by Marshall Hall and Dhiru Tanna, 
Comments on Exchange Rate Unification, paper presented to the 1971 
Universities Social Science Council Conference, Makerere, December, 1971. 
14. I have argued the case for a payments union of this sort in 
D.P. Ghai, The East African Community: The Way Ahead, in African 
Development, April, 1972. 
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In the East African context, it would be an attractive idea to provide in 
addition for the joint ownership of integration industries. By this means 
the concept of joint ownership already embodied in the railways, airways, 
harbours, shipping, and research institutes could be further extended to 
directly productive enterprises. The device of joint ownership will 
further ensure that all Partner States benefit from all integration 
industries and will thus have a stake in their viability and efficient 
operation. 
The major part of financing of these ventures could be undertaken 
by the East African Development Bank. However, in order for it to be able 
to do this, it will be necessary to plan for a considerable increase in its 
capital. Once again agreement will be much easier to reach if a major part 
of the additional finance could be provided by aid agencies - international, 
bilateral and regional such as the African Development Bank. A project of 
this kind designed to cement and consolidate the economic integration in 
the East Africanregion should have a special appeal for external donors. 
